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Abstract
This paper discusses an issue impacting intellectual property products with nearly zero marginal cost: the zero price
constraint. As established in the literature, aftermarkets result in a subsidization of the primary market, sometimes
resulting in prices below marginal cost. While aftermarket add-ons are now common in intellectual property products
such as software, the firms usually can't charge a primary market price below zero. This paper shows that with the
zero price constraint in effect, firms give more of the overall product away for free and pricing in the aftermarket is
determined by the number of competitors in the primary market; despite assuming all consumers are initially unaware
of the aftermarket's existence. With the constraint in effect, consumers are better off and firms can potentially earn
less profit.
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1. Introduction
Many software developers no longer sell products via boxed software, instead they sell it
in an ‘app store.’ App store platforms allow consumers to easily discover software for their
device or computer while managing the transaction process for the developer. One of the
most popular features of the app store environment is the ‘in-app purchase’ – allowing
developers to unlock features within their application (for a fee) after the user has used
the product for some period of time. Some common in-app purchases include additional
features in productivity applications and automatic level advancement in games.
As of 2015, there are more than 2.5 million mobile applications in the Apple App Store
and Google Play Store alone (Martin et al., 2015). This level of competition has resulted
in very low base good prices (the primary market), in comparison to software prices of
the past. Official Apple numbers from 2011 suggest that 37% of all app store applications
were priced at $0.00 and the average price was $3.64 (Elmer-DeWitt, 2011). An updated
analysis in 2016 suggest that 76% of applications are free and the average price is $1.13
(Poc, 2016).
For concreteness, consider ‘To-Do’ applications as an example. There are more than fifty
‘To-Do’ apps on the Mac App Store, most of which are free and rely heavily on in-app
purchases for revenue. For instance, the most popular application is Wunderlist, which
is available for free, but the user gains a slight increase in flexibility in managing very
expansive to-dos and cosmetic changes after an in-app purchase. A similar story can
be told with many other types of applications including social media utilities, weather
dashboards, and basic photo applications.
A large number of free products in app stores is not entirely unexpected. As established
in the literature, if boundedly rational consumers choose a good based on its primary
market price, the firms subsidize the primary market in hopes the consumer will buy the
aftermarket add-on – in this case the in-app purchase (for a literature review see Ellison
(2005) and Coppi (2007)). However, what current models do not explain is the small
increase in features the consumer gains by buying the add-on product (when there are
many products in the primary market).
Current literature suggests that less market power in the primary market results in more
of a subsidy (Borenstein et al., 2000; Gabaix and Laibson, 2006). But it is logistically
impossible to charge a primary market price below zero. Therefore, there exists a ‘zero
price constraint’ where the firm can’t charge a lower price in response to increased com-
petition. What is the firm to do facing this environment? In this paper, I will show that
they will ‘compete’ by reducing the number of features that they migrate to the add-on
product. This results in a decrease in the aftermarket price with more primary market
competition, despite assuming that consumers are initially unaware of the aftermarket.
In the end, fewer consumers will purchase the add-on product, some consumers will be
better off and firms may experience a reduction in profit as a result of the constraint.
Figure 1: The indifferent consumer (x∗
1A) is found
by setting the utility of buying product A from
Firm 1 equal to the utility of buying product A
from Firm 1/n. Any consumer between zero and
x∗
1A will purchase the good from Firm 1 as the
utility is greater. Therefore, demand is twice the
dark grey line. The primary market and
aftermarket are assumed to be independent, thus
any point on the Salop circle produces a full
spectrum of aftermarket positions.
2. Model
Assume that the consumers are boundedly rational such that they consider the expected
net utility of the primary product (product A) but they don’t obtain information about
the aftermarket (product B). Similar to the argument by Ellison (2005, p. 609), it is
infeasible for firms to advertise their competitors’ add-on prices and, while customers
may know that there are add-ons, the search costs are high enough that it is not worth
the effort to obtain accurate aftermarket price/feature information1. Consumers are
uniformly distributed in preferences around a Salop circle (1979) with circumference one.
The net utility of product A is assumed to be so high that outside goods are a non-issue.
As this paper’s focus is on intellectual property products, one cannot assume the size
of the add-on is endowed by the nature of the product (which is the more common
assumption in the literature). Therefore, in this model, firms choose the number of
features (utility) to transfer from product A to B. In the aftermarket, consumers choose
whether to buy B or avoid the add-on. While mathematically similar to a monopoly
producer, it is a refined interpretation. Assume the consumers’ primary market position
is independent of their position in the aftermarket.
We’ll first examine the model when the primary market price is above zero and then
compare it to when the ‘zero price constraint’ becomes binding.
2.1. Non-Zero Primary Market Pricing
Demand is found by locating the consumer who is indifferent between the goods of the
two neighboring firms. U1A is the utility of purchasing from the firm located at position
zero (Firm 1) and U 1
n
A represents the utility of purchasing from the firm located at 1/n
1Oftentimes, determining add-on prices for the consumer is not the largest hurdle. Unlike durable
goods, the size and scope of add-ons are artificially determined in software and the definitions are
product dependent (i.e. the price of the “Pro-Pack” provides no additional information as the user
doesn’t know what the “Pro-Pack” includes or how they would use it). To determine the benefit of
the add-on, the consumer must first become familiar with the software, often entering a large amount
of user data. This creates a switching cost. In this model, I assume that the switching cost is high
enough that the user does not search for another primary market product. In productivity software,
this is likely the case. But a less data or experience-driven application may violate this assumption.
(Firm 1/n) – where n is the number of firms in the industry. Setting U1A equal to U 1
n
A,
we solve for the indifferent consumer (Figure 1).
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where sA is the gross benefit to the consumer, tA is the travel cost and xA is the position
of the consumer. s1B represents the utility (features) transferred to the aftermarket by
Firm 1 while p1A represents Firm 1’s price in the primary market. s 1
n
B and p 1
n
A have
similar definitions for Firm 1/n.
While every consumer will purchase product A from someone, this is not true of product
B. B is a set of features equal to utility siB (for all consumers) packaged as an add-
on. Having purchased a product around the Salop circle, the consumer must decide if the
additional utility can be obtained with an alternative solution. The consumers can expend
a combination of effort and money to avoid the add-on (the alternative solution increases
in quality with a higher price), but the degree to which this will satisfy the consumer
will vary based on the customer’s preferences/creativity – not the least of which is the
degree to which they are annoyed that it doesn’t integrate into the primary product. In
describing how informed consumers avoid aftermarket rents, Gabaix and Laibson (2006,
p. 515) made a similar argument but they didn’t allow for varying abilities/preferences.
To add some concreteness to our discussion of the alternative to product B, consider
the to-do application in the introduction (Wunderlist). The aftermarket add-on allows
for an increase in the number of to-do subitems. As an alternative, the consumer could
manage to-do subitems in a spreadsheet program and attach the files to each main to-do
item in the application. While the utility from product B is the same for all users, some
technically inclined consumers who place a low value on their time might choose the
alternative solution. However, some consumers might view the alternative as more costly
due to a lower level of technical knowledge or a higher valuation of their time. If the price
of the add-on increased substantially, all consumers would be willing to consider more
elaborate or more expensive solutions; perhaps buying third party products to fulfill the
same function.
To find the indifferent consumer in the aftermarket, set the utility of product B (U1B)
equal to the alternative (UE), where quality of the alternative solution is equal to the
price of product B (piB) and consumers with differing preferences represented by their
position between zero and one (xiB) in a Hotelling city (1929)
2.
2While there are alternative methods of modeling this relationship, they are mathematically more
complex and do not result in a different interpretation. For instance, using a multiplier on UE
would model the idea that the alternative solution is less desirable to all consumers due to the lack of
integration into the primary market good; we’ve achieved the same interpretation by setting the mean
s1B|{z}
U1B
= p1B − tB
✓
3
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− x1B
◆
| {z }
UE
x∗1B =
3
2
−
p1B
tB
+
s1B
tB
(2)
where x∗1B describes the proportion of Firm 1’s product A customers that buy product
B.
For simplicity, assume that the firms have zero marginal costs and incur development
cost f . This is nearly the case for intellectual property products with digital distribution.
pi1 = 2
0
BBB@n(s 1nB − s1B − p1A + p 1nA) + tA2ntA| {z }
x∗
A
1
CCCA
0
BBB@p1A +
0
BBB@32 − p1BtB + s1BtB| {z }
x∗
1B
1
CCCA p1B
1
CCCA− f (3)
Firm 1’s profit equation is the proportion of the Salop circle captured by Firm 1 (2x∗A)
multiplied by the product A price (p1A) plus the revenue from product B. x
∗
A is doubled
due to the firms located on Firm 1’s left and right on the Salop circle. The revenue from
product B is the proportion of the firm’s product A customers who buy product B (x∗1B)
multiplied by the number of product A customers (2x∗A) times price (p1B).
Using a solution approach akin to that of Salop’s original paper (1979), we take derivatives
with respect to p1A, p1B and s1B (and set them equal to zero). However, as we know that
all firms react identically, we can then replace the neighbor variables p 1
n
A, p 1
n
B and s 1
n
B
with their Firm 1 counterparts. This reveals our system of equations to find the optimal
solution.
1
n
−
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−
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2tA
= 0
(4)
This system of equations can be solved for p1A, p1B and s1B. As all firms are identical,
the “1” in the subscripts of the final solution are replaced with i.
of the alternative solution to piB−tB . Similarly, one could argue that there is a portion of aftermarket
utility that is fixed and not chosen by the firm (sf ). This would result in UiB = siB + sf . Such an
alteration would result in slight variations in the solutions for siB (
tB
2
− sf and
2tA
n
−
3tB
2
− sf for the
unconstrained and constrained result, respectfully), but would otherwise not alter the interpretation
of the model. However, when there is only a fixed utility component to the aftermarket good the
solution is substantially altered. Such a model is included in the appendix.
piA =
tA
n
− tB
piB = tB
siB =
tB
2
(5)
The firm subsidizes the aftermarket by charging a lower price in the primary market and
transfers enough features (siB) to fully capture the aftermarket; substituting the final
solutions in 5, x∗iB = 1. In aggregate, this does not change net profit from a standard
Salop circle (pii =
tA
n2
− f). This is similar to previous literature (e.g. Lal and Matutes
(1994)) where the addition of the aftermarket has no net effect on profit. However, we
should consider the limitations of location models. If the average piA in the industry
drops, the size of the industry likely increases, which is not reflected in the model.
2.2. Zero Primary Market Pricing
If tB >
tA
n
then the price of A in 5 is logistically impossible and the zero price constraint
becomes binding. Assuming the primary market price is binding at zero, equation 1 can
be restated as follows:
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U1A
= (sA − s 1
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(6)
siB is the only choice for the firm in the primary market. Restating the profit equation,
the firm only earns revenue from product B.
pi1 = 2
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BBB@n(s 1nB − s1B) + tA2ntA| {z }
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Taking derivatives with respect to p1B and s1B and replacing neighbor variables reveals
the system of equations.
s1B
ntB
+
3
2n
−
2p1B
ntB
= 0
p1B
ntB
+
p21B
tAtB
−
p1Bs1B
tAtB
−
3p1B
2tA
= 0
(8)
Figure 2: The aftermarket is a choice between buying the add-on and the alternative (avoidance).
Utility from avoidance varies from consumer to consumer. Finding the indifferent consumer finds the
proportion of consumers willing to buy the add-on. The indifferent consumer is located at 1 when the
zero price constraint is unbinding. With a binding zero price constraint, the indifferent consumer is
located at tA
ntB
. The dark gray line represents the proportion of product A customers who buy product
B.
With two equations in 8, the system can be solved for the two unknowns p1B and s1B. As
in the the non-zero pricing section, I’ve replaced the “1” with an i in the final solution.
piB =
tA
n
siB =
2tA
n
−
3tB
2
(9)
Unlike the unconstrained problem, pricing in the aftermarket depends on n. Further, the
aftermarket is not fully captured; substituting the final solutions in 9, x∗iB =
tA
ntB
, which is
less than one when the zero price constraint is binding (tB >
tA
n
) and decreases with more
competition3(Figure 2). Similarly, rearranging tB >
tA
n
in 10 shows that fewer features
are transferred to the aftermarket.
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n
− 2tB ⇒
tB
2|{z}
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>
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−
3tB
2| {z }
siB with zero
primary market price
(10)
This decrease in aftermarket features results in a decrease in aftermarket sales. The
relationship between aftermarket features and add-on sales can be explored by taking
the difference in siB in the absence of a zero price constraint and when the constraint is
binding:
∆siB =
tB
2|{z}
siB with non-zero
primary market price
−
✓
2tA
n
−
3tB
2
◆
| {z }
siB with zero
primary market price
⇒ ∆siB = 2tB(1−
tA
ntB|{z}
x∗
iB
) (11)
As characterized by equation 11, fewer aftermarket features results in fewer aftermarket
sales (shown by a decrease in tA
ntB
with an increase in ∆siB). This deviation from the
3x∗B is bounded between 3/4 and 1. siB is negative if
tA
ntB
< 3/4.
unconstrained solution is also reflected in the final profit equation:
pii =
t2A
n3tB
− f = −f +
2x∗
Az}|{
1
n
piBz}|{
tA
n| {z }
pii with non-zero
primary market price
x∗
iBz}|{
tA
ntB
(12)
When xiB < 1 the firm earns less profit than when the zero price constraint is unbinding.
Given tB >
tA
n
when the zero price constraint is binding, this is always true.
3. Discussion
Due to the fixed industry size assumption, a formal surplus analysis can be problematic
with location models. However, the prices of the two products reveal a surprising amount
of information. All consumers purchase both the primary market product and aftermarket
good for a total of tA
n
when the zero price constraint is unbinding. For the proportion
of consumers who buy the aftermarket good when the zero price constraint is in effect
( tA
ntB
), there is no net change in welfare as the total price and utility remain the same.
However, those who do not buy the good are made better off as they reap the benefits of
the primary market good and choose to avoid the add-on (which, for them, is optimal).
While the average consumer is better off when the zero price constraint is in effect,
firm profit isn’t as optimistic. Assuming the industry size is fixed, firms experience a
profit reduction as a function of reduced aftermarket sales. Under this fixed industry size
assumption, the firms are worse off in comparison to both when the zero price constraint
isn’t binding and when there is no aftermarket (which comes to the same net price and
profit as the unconstrained model). A simple algebraic rearrangement shows that for the
firms in a zero price constraint environment to be as well off as they would have been
without an aftermarket, the industry size must increase by a factor of ntB
tA
. While such
growth may occur as a result of the decrease in the industry average primary market
price from tA
n
to zero, it is not guaranteed.
4. Conclusion
The zero price constraint has four important effects: (1) fewer features are transferred
to the aftermarket (2) fewer consumers buy the add-on (3) the add-on price decreases as
a function of primary market competition and (4) profit is lower under some conditions.
Without the ability to the lower the primary market price, the firms resort to increasing
the features of the free product, which reduces the utility of the add-on. With the lower
utility obtained from the aftermarket product, fewer customers can justify the purchase,
particularly when the primary market is more competitive. This leads to lower profit for
the firm when the industry is of a fixed size. In fact, while some product categories may
benefit from in-app purchases, there may be some categories that are worse off. As the
presence of app stores expands from mobile devices to other environments such as desktop
and television (Fowler, 2015; Kane and Sherr, 2011; Pogue, 2012), one must consider the
implications of the zero price constraint.
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Appendix: Fixed Utility of the Aftermarket Good
An astute referee suggested a variation on the model where the aftermarket product could not
be provided as part of the primary market product. Instead the aftermarket good’s utility is
fixed (denoted as sf in this model). The best example of such a product would be a video game
where a frustrated customer is offered the opportunity to skip a level if they pay a fee. Such
a product would be nearly costless to provide, but would be only appealing to customers who
have already purchased the primary market product.
This variation to the model modifies the primary market indifferent consumer to the following:
x∗A =
n(p 1
n
A − p1A) + tA
2ntA
(13)
With this modified indifferent consumer the new profit equation for Firm 1 would be:
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For brevity, I will provide the final solutions and profit:
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When the zero price constraint is binding, the profit equation is simplified further:
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This results in the following price and profit solution:
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Notably the two Λ sections are identical. Therefore, we can compare the two profits in the
following way:
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Λ− f ⇒
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?
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1
n
Λ ⇒
tA
n
?
<> Λ (18)
Therefore, when piA is negative (
tA
n
< Λ) and the zero price constraint is binding, the constrained
solution is more profitable. Otherwise, the unconstrained solution is more profitable.
